Tenant identifier accepted from a client-supplied header
X-Tenant-Id, and reads records belonging to another customer. No credential theft required.
Your system architecture, reviewed against real-world attacks.
Checked against the current OWASP, MITRE ATLAS and agentic AI threat landscape.
Start here
Deep, practical write-ups on the failures we see most often. Each one leads with the fix, then the reasoning.
Why a client-supplied tenant ID is the most common way multi-tenant SaaS leaks data, and the two-line fix that closes it.
Read the guide → Agent permissionsWhat excessive agency looks like in a LangChain or tool-calling agent, and how to scope credentials down to the user who prompted it.
Read the guide → Over-privileged rolesA practical way to find the wildcard permissions and unused roles sitting in your AWS account right now.
Read the guide →Coverage
Four patterns come up again and again.
The deliverable
Every finding names the attack, the fix, and the requirement it satisfies. The same document works for your engineers and your buyer's security reviewer. This is what one looks like.
X-Tenant-Id, and reads records belonging to another customer. No credential theft required.
↑ Illustrative example, not a real client finding.
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Contact
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Or email hello@zyvra.studio directly.
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